The mindset of the populations of Siberian origin (part 16)
--
⟵ The mindset of the populations of Siberian origin (part 15)
As a general impression around the topics from the previous part, more attention should be paid to the Haydar aka approach of the authorities frenzying the population in an arduous, psychologically refreshing struggle, with the underlying feeling that the leadership has figured out the direction. The population has it easy psychologically for not needing to confront themselves the unknown of real life with a decrepit car. It depends on whether the authorities really figured out what should be done. Normally, to really figure out something less superficial, the authorities need to face the realism from Yarash-yarash of the Uzbek singer Hadicha. The population should wonder more if the feeling of the leadership having it figured out is something they can rely on. And, if there is something they can rely on, as in Atatürk’s case, they should not just lean on that lazily.
This topic has many other ramifications and there is a lot to say about it. There are also specific variations among the local cultures. Just to remind some specific Korean nuances, as in the recurring use of words like bbali-bbali (quickly-quickly) or in yoryong (short-cut). They are a recurring trope and theme in the Korean approach to real life, with the underlying concept that it is teeming with all kinds of unexpected possibilities to do things much easier.
This supposes a more direct openness to the concept of diachronic thinking, but it can bar your access to the larger view of the situation if you don’t know how to handle the novelty of such unexpected perspectives that show easier short-cuts. Each such simplifying short-cut in fact opens the mind to unexpected complexities the current organization around that topic sits on (the kind of increased awareness the Russian society does not know how to grapple with after the Communist period). To put it more directly, each such short-cut opens the mind to how limited psychologically is the human worldview when under impression it has a basic understanding of everything. There is a huge world of psychological possibilities beyond, but how to deal with it as a grand vision? The Korean nuance is about being accepting to some extent of the idea that there is much more beyond what appears as human organization at first glance (which can also mean being accepting of not having a grand vision about the situation ready to act upon).
Right across the strait, the Japanese ethos is weary of indulging in just going along with whatever short-cut novelty appears in their mind, it may feel dangerous if there is no relevant background of wisdom around it. Depending on how their mood and preparation is in relation to the unknown, it may feel dangerous to seek easy ways to accomplish tasks. They want to keep the grand vision and they may have reactions to reject such easy ways if they don’t know how to relate the current psychological organization to the revealed complexity. Alternatively, they may also enter in Haydar aka mode with some grueling arduous faffing around it, in the hope of blunting their current sense of self towards an authentic diachronicity while still keeping a single thread coherence and thus maybe find the mental passage to the next-door house full of riches of the man who supposedly has the larger understanding of the situation.
Some pieces of Turkish popular wisdom around this topic warn of the propensity to slide into the impression that you just stumbled upon some unexpectedly realistic, authentic, profound ways to do something much more naturally and impactful that look like on the way to revolutionize by leaps and bounds an existing situation. Dereyi görmeden paçaları sıvama (“don’t roll up your trousers before reaching the stream”), also doğmamış çocuğa don biçilmez (“one does not cut cloth for a yet unborn child”) and many other sayings of this kind. This is about two concomitant directions of the mind. One from the perspective of the classical castles in the air grand vision that already goes ahead by leaps and bounds about what a great potential this new perception has. Another one that has such a direct realism about the complexity the new perception opens.
The latter is not so threatened by the complexity, it already thinks from its perspective with a diachronic organizational approach that pays attention to the abyssal gist, but it realizes it takes some more time to further investigate and work with the situation in order to feel like making some sense of the revealed depth. It still cannot provide itself easily a grand vision, hence the mind has to pay attention to how the concept of grand vision relates to the realization that there is much more to understand until you really make some sense of the revealed depth.
These sayings can also give some idea that there is hope at a popular level in working with the diachronic psychology. The current Erdoğan phenomenon in Turkey is an example of a recurring issue that I notice stemming from the use of the diachronic psychology in social organization. This psychology has such a great potential, but it may require a steep learning curve to do something with it. The three cases of deeper supernova effects in relation to modernity that I wrote about in the previous part follow in fact some earlier major reforms, respectively Peter the Great’s Reforms, Meiji Reforms, Atatürk’s Reforms (in the last case, it is about potential supernova effects, if Atatürk’s organization unravels and people like Erdoğan have their way).
These earlier major reforms were made possible by Altaic psychological insights into the sense of identity, by realizing how fluid it can be, how you can have a plurality of identity developments after experiencing the plurality of “cinema seat” threads acting like one in very difficult circumstances, like the commentary around Yalan (translation) of the Turkish singer Aleyna Tilki from the previous part. Some people manage to have more depth in working with this and then, especially when inspired by the modernity of European origin, they shape and transform their societies by leaps and bounds. There is something inspirational in the Western modernity, as it has a fluid gaze into the diachronic unknown of the future and its concept of never-ending quest can feel refreshing (especially in those initial stages of modernity from the past that looked like a triumphalist never-ending freshness).
However, later on large parts of these Altaic societies tend to increasingly feel like not understanding what is going on. How do these changes happen? It may feel deeply unsettling for them to gaze into the diachronic fluidity enabling them, they just need to go along with those who are more in tune. They feel left out, many of them also are likely less able to make some use of the opportunities brought by the changes. And, among those who make use, there are still many who feel too uprooted and disoriented psychologically. It simmers for a while until they become increasingly conscious about their own situation and blockage. It feels unwarranted, as they do not sense how consequential and normal is the larger diachronic fluid psychology.
This turns into what I call “the rule of the idiots”, the envisaged turnaround is specifically framed by lazy demagogue politicians as giving power to those who feel unjustly left out, since they perceive as very inconsequential their mental blockage in dealing with the changes. The profound social reforms started by Peter the Great ushered later on the Russian version of Communism and, among the Tatars, the Wäisi movement (the latter largely faded away during the 1930’s purges). Atatürk’s Reforms usher now the demagogue Erdoğan with an implied message of giving power to those left out by the reforms. The Meiji Reforms slid into narrow-minded militarism scared of modernity and seeking to create a self-centered simplistic “explanation” of the world.
In this last case, it was not specifically framed as a “rule of the idiots”, as the Japanese society already battled with this issue for centuries and was already overly tired of it at that time, as I will get into detail further below. But it was still along the lines of Russian Communism and of Erdoğan stuff in terms of being scared of what these reforms were opening for the sense of personal identity and of functioning as an individual.
The leadership of those initial reforms had some sense around how to work with the diachronic psychology and keep it sustainable in time, not turning it into supernova effects. They had something of the Oşko approach to put the reforms in practice, in this case not so much as an immersion in an utter diachronic unknown as in the video, as it was just about integrating some foreign psychological discoveries. They were not about a Haydar aka overuse, which supposes posing as relying on a hidden clarity of the mind that the commoners cannot fathom, yet they are assured that the leadership is explicitly catering to their insecurities.
This is what happened with the next leadership, as large parts of the population could not follow psychologically what was going on. They were feeling left out and this invited Haydar aka type of leadership boasting a clarity of the mind in facing the complex unknown (and this specific Haydar aka approach invites also serious supernova effects when asked for too much clarity amid complexity). This went also in sync with the Western modernity itself to some extent, as it progressively needed to realize the necessity of more profound insights around the vivacity it unleashed.
The initial leadership was not so interested in “explaining” the world and the meaning of life in general. In the case of Peter the Great’s Reforms and of Meiji Reforms, they largely went along with the triumphalist spirit of the Western society of those times, not yet so aware of what complexity they were unleashing with their modernity. In Atatürk’s case, he bucked the trend of the increasingly weary Western world of those times around the complexity unleashed by modernity. His intentions for straightforward reform were kind of late in the game, the World War One was a serious watershed that made much more clear what a complexity was the modernity ushering in the people’s minds. Nevertheless, he had an inner balance in facing that and was not interested in the lousy ideologies spurred by that war, seeking to “explain” the world and the meaning of life.
He found a solution in that inner space disconnected from the classical human thinking, in which you can work with the gist of the diachronic psychology without the need to explain the world and the meaning of life, as in İstanbul Ağlıyor of Gülay. You can keep a sense of normality and inner coherence while externally it feels like in Yuh Yuh of Koray Avcı. He attenuated this external perception with his tin-can nation concept that minimizes drastically the diachronic complexity, peace at home, peace in the world. His organization was disconnected even from most of the Turks remaining outside of the borders of Turkey (except later on the more sizable Cypriot minority).
It looks like it did not appear obvious to him that this is not a long-term solution, especially when the situation grows and moves away from the difficulties of the end of the Ottoman Empire. People increasingly manifest themselves as part of the larger world beyond the tin-can concept and then they have to deal with the complexity from Yuh Yuh of Koray Avcı. They joyfully identified with a variety of competing lazy ideologies “explaining” the world and the meaning of life. The situation turned into an entrenchment of the role of the army as the older woman from Mini-mini making sure the child-like pair is not doing stupid things again.
Erdoğan managed to dismantle the role of the army, his leadership is Haydar aka-type, which, applied in the modern context, coming after profound reforms, turns into an explicit “rule of the idiots”. His problem is that he cannot access the depths of the mind to frenzy the population, since he has no answer to Atatürk’s comfortability with the unknown that the Turkish state organization is still imbued with. In this case, it is only a potential of serious supernova effects if the situation continues like this for a while to unravel more and more Atatürk’s legacy. Hopefully, some wiser trends appear in the Turkish society, otherwise, on the grand scale of history, all of Atatürk’s accomplishments would look like only a temporary staving of the collapse at the end of the First World War.
The situation of the Tatars by the end of the 19th century — beginning of the 20th century created a context for two concomitant directions. One was the Jadid movement, realizing the decrepitude and the need for serious reforms. This was something along the lines of Peter the Great’s Reforms, Meiji Reforms and Atatürk’s Reforms. Another one was the Wäisi movement as a reaction against the modernity ushered in the Russian Empire by Peter the Great’s Reforms. Initially it was something Erdoğan-style, about the fate of the lower class people, harking back to religion and nationalism as means to reconstruct a simplistic ecosystem of meaning. Especially after the Russian Revolution of 1905, it increasingly veered towards an Islamic socialism.
Both these two directions were persecuted by the Tsarist authorities. When the Bolsheviks came to power, the Wäisis mostly identified with it. The Jadidis were soon in a collision course with the self-centered Bolshevik control of the narrative and were defeated militarily or marginalized. The Wäisis did not survive much longer either, they were largely obliterated by the later 1930’s purges of Stalin.
In the pre-modern context, when it was not so much about structural changes in the society by leaps and bounds, the difference between those who have a better grasp at working with the diachronic psychology and those who don’t used to determine some other nuances. In the political sphere, it can turn into a propensity for instability, as those with a better grasp may not pay attention to what a complexity they are unleashing with their accomplishments and their leadership can slide into supernova effects and/or turn into something stale.
The pre-modern supernova effects were not so psychologically deep as those determined by reactions to the major reforms. It was mostly about the crumbling of the respective polity and the consequential ramifications. As for the situation going stale, its issue is that it goes against the very core of the diachronic psychology, it determines feelings of psychological suffocation and propensity for awakening the zestful, arduous state of mind in the people who are not invested in the current power structure. This is the very state of mind that may have brought the current leadership to power in the past. As they turned stale, the feeling of psychological suffocation awakens this state of mind in other people.
The basic Altaic feeling of psychological suffocation with stale situations is like in Ko’pkari of the Uzbek singer Hosila Rahimova. The female singer has this feeling of psychological suffocation with a stale context and is inciting the men to do something destructive. How radiant is her face at 2:14, after the men throw the lamb in the circle. That act has broken down what was stale in her mind. Further on, it is not necessary to be a woman specifically behind such men. It is part of the culture, this is how the men grow up and think themselves since childhood.
The simple breakdown of what was stale with some destruction can give the impression that a magnificent refreshment in social life will appear if you just destroy its existing structure. It stems from the same impression that there is a core in the classical masculine organization that can work with the diachronic psychology. It turns into the impression that the core is there eagerly waiting to be brought to life and it is so consequential and its magnificent plenary expressivity will follow so naturally (and, with this mindset, if successful, it is a matter of time to turn stale the new developments too).
In societies like the Korean and the Russian ones, which more propensity to think from a static worldview under Chinese, respective European influence, there is a consequential increased propensity for this state of mind to have a nuance of being under impression of having the right knowledge about everything. It brings new nuances to the state of mind of the woman from Naqshli of the Uzbek singer Ravshanbek Abdullayev and, when also under feelings of suffocation from stale situations, it turns into something like some of the music of the Korean band 2NE1, ending up in destructive violence as in I’m the best or in sex as in Can’t nobody. The feelings of suffocation can be determined by the very thoughts of having the right knowledge about everything, which can be so ridiculously stale by themselves.
The more pensive approach to this state of mind from Narushaem pravila (“Break the rules”) of the Russian singers Hanna and Luxor, feels like an increased wisdom around these issues among some Russians, even more after the painful nutcase Communist period. There is some awareness that just inciting the man may not solve anything, that magnificent refreshment in social life may not appear. But still the necessity for psychological freshness is there.
This is a woman who ended up in classical masculine psychology and cannot find the way to the diachronic psychology. She still has some feminine ongoing work with the diachronic psychology, she still has the perspective from the inner space, as when she covers her head with a hood (and the man ends up thinking from the same perspective). It does not turn into such an impossible situation as for Tolstoy after writing Anna Karenina. Dostoevsky inadvertently discovered a way beyond this situation altogether when he was about to be executed.
The path leading to this situation is the single thread of work with the diachronic psychology in difficult circumstances as in Kazagım-ay of the Kazakh band Gaukhartas. In normal social life this can continue to give the impression of a capability to solve any problems, as in Naqshli (with the subsequent slide into supernova effects if assumed too blindly by men in large scale political organization). This still has a genuine immersion in the gist of the diachronic psychology. The use of a single thread under impression it can solve any issue can turn into a stale static “knowledge” about the world if the respective Altaic culture is too much under the influence of the other cultures that think in terms of stale static “knowledge”.
It something much more suffocating than situations like in İnfilak (translation) of the Turkish singer Gülben Ergen. It is much more than ending up yourself under impression of knowing stuff. It is about ending up thinking from the perspective of an elaborated static construct already long-term honed by a different culture. This mostly happens among the Russians and Koreans, but it can appear also at lower levels among any other culturally Altaic population.
There is also another twist around this circular issue of arduous diachronic psychology bringing people to power only to turn into something stale. Some people may have deeper perceptions around how to relate the gist of the diachronic psychology with social organization. This turns into the opposite effect of chronic instability, it creates dynasties with such a depth of spiritual charisma that are very hard to dislodge psychologically. There is something abyssal in their projection of power, which tends to block the minds of the people who have themselves impulses to grab the ultimate power. The Ottoman dynasty was and the Yamato dynasty is one of the longest in the human history. In practice it still turned into an ongoing political instability, as they could not hold the practical power for long. But still, the new powerful ones could not dislodge psychologically these dynasties.
I will get into more detail about these two dynasties in future parts of the series, as I need to introduce some other aspects. I want to write here a bit more about the Yamato dynasty, as the political instability around it had some nuances in about the same area with the aforementioned “rule of the idiots”. The recurring theme in the Japanese history of “the low ruling the high” (gekokujō) has some of these nuances too, resulting from the huge gap created by the psychological power and charisma of the Yamato dynasty. It was exceedingly difficult to really face the abyssal level of its psychological power. This dynasty lost after some time the practical direct power, but not the spiritual one, and the situation turned into a mess of political leadership. Those who had practical power found difficult to translate it into a spiritual one with relevant depth. They could not match the psychological depth of the Yamato dynasty.
The solution turned into finding ways to integrate the psychological power of the dynasty into their own practical power. Still, the lack of psychological power meant ongoing instability for centuries, until there appeared an increasing background feeling that there is nothing more to add to this simple direct quest for power. The Tokugawa regime, themselves originally a small clan no one would have bet they would reach the apex of practical power, had a more clear mind to enforce a more strict hierarchical society as a way to ensure some stability. It came on the background of the general tiredness of the society with the instability and of the feeling that there is not much to add to it. The joy of having your own point of view and the impression of having better takes on how to rule looked increasingly idiotic.
The current Japanese cultural take on hierarchy is like the utter opposite of the propensity for “the rule of the idiots”. It is not so much a hierarchy as a glorification of power, but more as a long-term accumulated weariness about the abyssal complexity unleashed by whoever thinks is able to rule. This shielded to some extent the Japanese society from reactionary reverberations of the Meiji Reforms explicitly stated as “the rule of the idiots”. In practice, there still appeared reactionary reverberations, it still was a practical “rule of the idiots”, but they did not slide into too much ideological bulletproofing against modernity, it was not so much a modern “rule for the idiots” seeking to explain the meaning of social life. And when they dabbled with ideology in the 60’s, it quickly sunk in what a psychological complexity they were getting into.
Obviously, this twist in the Japanese history is not entirely a valuable solution. What I see good in it is the increased realization that you inevitably need to face a complexity opened by others in your own society (in this case, the Yamato dynasty). You may have the impression of an impetus and better ideas about how to rule, only to end up in a mess of complexity.
But the fact that the Japanese concept of hierarchy is the utter opposite of “the rule of the idiots” means also that it stays in the same parameters as the latter. The concept of hierarchy in itself is not so good. And nowadays, especially after the adventurism with the Haydar aka type of strive for number one economy and its ensuing psychological slumber in a huge complexity, it is necessary more than ever to explore self-expression, in a responsible manner facing the mental abyss of the diachronic psychology.
What I see as the basic aspect in this slide from “leadership with psychological depth” to the “rule of the idiots” is that you inevitably need to simply be an “idiot”. This is what that initial leadership went through in order to have some depth. This is what the diachronic psychology reduces you to, as the man tinkering stupidly with those machine parts in contrast with the “Terminator” woman in Naqshli of Ravshanbek Abdullayev. The psychological depth stems from being within this unexpected perspective and realizing what an idiot you are in contact with real life, when immersed in the diachronic psychology.
This can give a depth in relating to the human sense of organization. The other people who cannot grasp the new valences introduced by those who work with the diachronic psychology end up themselves feeling like idiots. In this case, it is an unwarranted feeling of being an idiot, as it does not have the the path to this perception determined by relating with real life, as in the case of those who managed to have deeper insights.
The “Terminator” approach to normal social life from Naqshli is not sustainable in itself if you seek to organize life with it, as I already wrote about in the previous part. It creates a contrast between the impression you can solve any problem with this state of mind and the increased awareness of the complexity of what you seek to organize, thus ending up in supernova effects.
It has something valuable, this was likely the start of the Altaic worldview, and you need to sense how its gist relates to normal human social organization. The other side of the “Terminator” is the realization of the psychological normality of this diachronic worldview, which renders the classical masculine organization like that man tinkering stupidly with the machine parts. You can’t really return to being a classical man (or to being a woman relying on classical masculinity, if you realize that there is no core in the classical human organization that can work sustainably in normal social life with the “Terminator” approach). In some circumstances, some people have their mind opened to how to go beyond this blockage and realize how to reorganize their perceptions and work with the diachronic psychology in normal social life. That situation of stupid tinkering turns in fact into an opening of the mind to unexpected perspectives.
Such people can have huge advantages in social life as a result of this, while historically the process ending up in such opening of the mind was rather vague. It did not turn into some clear consciousness and explanation around what is about. Thus it appears as something coming out of nowhere for the others.
There is this propensity in the Altaic societies for such occasional opening of the mind to just manifest in practical results in real life and maybe also to continue to be transmitted in the family. It turns into some charisma of the respective individuals in some specific field (which may continue to be transmitted to their descendants). The most spectacular one is in the field of political power, but it can be in all kinds of fields. In the first place, usually it is not about a general opening of the mind, it tends to be only about some specific aspects of the human social life that can differ from individual to individual.
If it is about political power, in some cases, it can still end up blended with “Terminator” approaches to real life, with the inevitable supernova effects price to pay if the person does not sense the underlying issues of the “Terminator” approach. For example, Atatürk used the latter approach to some extent as a response to overwhelming difficulties, but he stopped when he sensed that it slides into something provoking a complexity he had no expertise for.
Such openings of the mind result from practical circumstances of the individuals in contact with real life. Usually, they do not turn into a study of what are they about. What I write here is a result of growing up in the modern inquisitive worldview, of a plurality of culturally Altaic backgrounds with some different nuances (Turkish, Tatar, Hungarian), of backgrounds in some other (originally) Asian cultures that were of great help in having different perspectives around these topics (Jewish and Romani), of living in an European environment and also of having European backgrounds too.
The modern European environment is under impression it has a basic understanding of anything in the world, it just needs to fill in the unknown details on the go (while there is also something valuable in its discovery of modernity, as I will get into more detail some time later). This turns into a contrast with the Altaic perception of the fluid diachronic psychology and into a further need to clarify what is going on around this contrast. Some of my European backgrounds (Romanian, Greek, Ukrainian) are themselves at the crossroads between the European and the Altaic worldviews.
Something like Dostoevsky’s path from Crime and Punishment’s Lizaveta to The Idiot and further on to the possibility to think in unexpected non-linear ways beyond classical human organization in The Brothers Karamazov appears from this contrast with the modernity of the European environment (this is not as specifically the path, it is just one among many nuances, I am mentioning it as a well-known example I am aware of). When paying attention to what is this psychology about, you realize you kind of need to face the revealed idiocy of the man from Naqshli. This more direct view of the situation turns into a much more conscious and general approach to the “idiotic” state of mind. And, from there, to a more general view of the opening of the mind to work with the diachronic psychology.
When in public, this levels the field around being an idiot as an unexpected opening of the mind, not as something coming out of nowhere, inexplicable and unwarranted. I envisage it as leaving to the people their part in figuring out some aspects, as fundamentally this is about facing real life. It is the utter opposite of the spoiled brat approach of Erdoğan sitting in Atatürk’s palm. The much more direct view at the situation also opens possibilities to face much better the issue of turning stale after a while.
I realize I did not explain by now what is the music video Naqshli of the Uzbek singer Ravshanbek Abdullayev about. When she sees the dog, the rendered information is that it is the dog of the singer Ravshanbek Abdullayev, it does not bite and the beast is afraid of is a lion. Then, when the guys in the car make fun of her, the information that appears is that they are stupid boys, no need to be afraid, give them a nose job. When the initial “idiot” tries to approach her, the information that appears is that he is a human with a pure heart.
The “idiot” condition from the beginning of the video is a general opening to the diachronic psychology. Much of the natural appearance of Altaic individuals with some opening of the mind in various psychological fields tends to be a localized practical “idiocy” in contact with the complexity of the real life that soon slides into valuable fluid diachronic expertise in the respective psychological area. The thorough reforms spurred by the Western modernity create a general sense of “idiocy” for the part of the population that does not sense how to go along with them.
As it was not their own experience in dealing with real life, this general “idiocy” can feel unwarranted and it remains as just a mental blockage without sensing the gist of the diachronic psychology. It can further slide into the “rule of the idiots” in the idea of restoring some sense of meaning in life as a defense against the complexity their mind was opened to, usually in combination with a leadership that it is under impression it can solve any issue coming its way with the grueling Haydar aka approach.
Some people realize more profound insights beyond the stupid tinkering and can change the society by leaps and bounds. Those who are disrupted by such changes want to get back to the situation from Naqshli by seeking someone like the “Terminator” woman.
The specific “pure heart” nuance from the end of this video is the way the general opening to the diachronic psychology appears when noticed and appreciated by someone in the woman’s circumstances. These circumstances are about being immersed in the Altaic discovery of how the plurality of “cinema seat” threads work as one in difficult contexts. This discovery offers possibilities to act in real life, its part with “work as one” is also superficially inspired from the classical masculine way of being pro-active and the person continues with this plenitude of diachronic expressivity in normal social life like a struggle through difficulties.
It is an unexpected way of really taking in consideration the diachronic psychology while assuming something similar to a pro-active stance within the ecosystem of meaning of the classical masculine organization. Someone like the initial man is also opened to the diachronic psychology and really takes it in consideration, but, in his case, it rather turns into a messing of his classical masculine psychological organization. It looks more like a hardcore general opening and further on it depends on how much he can hone new ways of psychological organization that take diachronicity in consideration.
He is noticed by the woman that he really takes in consideration the diachronic fluid plenitude and this translates for her as having a “pure heart”. He is not following linear self-centered classical masculine thinking patterns. Further on, it depends to what extent this perception of purity continues focused on the diachronic gist or it slides into static plateaus of knowledge as control of the situation. This concept of “pure heart” can share the general issues of the impression that the initial Altaic psychological discovery can simply work in normal social life. There is something valuable at the core, but it is necessary further work to see how it can be related to normal social life.
Consider Dostoevksy’s path from Lizaveta to how “the Idiot” sees the world, opening the mind to views like what the girl with the lantern shows in Yuh Yuh (translation) of the Turkish band Cemali. From this you can follow with the mind how supposed quests of good turn into Demons and, when you further investigate, you realize that you can’t really rely on the classical human organization for an ecosystem of meaning, like in The Brothers Karamazov. This further opens the quest for more authentic and serious organizational aspects.
